Game forms are studied where the acyclicity, in a stronger or weaker sense, of (coalition or individual) improvements is ensured in all derivative games. In every game form generated by an "ordered voting" procedure, individual improvements converge to Nash equilibria if the players restrict themselves to "minimal" strategy changes. A complete description of game forms where all coalition improvement paths lead to strong equilibria is obtained: they are either dictatorial, or voting (or rather lobbing) about two outcomes. The restriction to minimal strategy changes ensures the convergence of coalition improvements to strong equilibria in every game form generated by a "voting by veto" procedure. JEL Classification Number: C 72.
Introduction
A.-A. Cournot considered best response dynamics long before the expression "game theory" came into use. Such processes were studied in various contexts since then (Topkis, 1979 (Topkis, , 1998 Moulin, 1984; Vives, 1990; Milgrom and Roberts, 1991; Kandori and Rob, 1995) . Monderer and Shapley (1996) started a similar approach to better reply dynamics. This paper continues the search for natural classes of strategic games where the acyclicity, in a stronger or weaker sense, of (coalition or individual) improvements is ensured (Rosenthal, 1973; Germeier and Vatel', 1974; Sela, 1992; Monderer and Shapley, 1996; Milchtaich, 1996; Holzman and Law-yone, 1997; Konishi et al., 1997; Kukushkin, 1999 Kukushkin, , 2000 Kukushkin, , 2002ab, 2004ab, 2006 Friedman and Mezzetti, 2001; Kukushkin et al., 2005) . Unlike most of the previous literature, we only consider game forms, i.e., we put no restrictions on the preferences of the players, only on strategic interactions.
The topic is somewhat related to the study of consistent, or solvable, game forms (Gurvich, 1975 (Gurvich, , 1988 Moulin, 1976; Peleg, 1978; Abdou 1995 Abdou , 1998 Abdou and Keiding, 2003; Boros et al., 2007) ; however, the acyclicity of improvements is a much stronger (and rarer) property than just the existence of an equilibrium.
In the case of two players, a kind of complete description of game forms where all individual improvement paths in all derivative games lead to Nash equilibria was obtained by Boros et al. (2008ab) ; for more than two players, there is no clear prospect for that. Weaker notions of acyclicity of individual improvements result in wider classes of game forms, also without clear prospects for a characterization. The most interesting and important class of game forms with acyclic individual improvements is that of games with perfect information (Kukushkin, 2002a) ; the results of that paper are somewhat extended here. Similar properties of "ordered voting game forms" (Proposition 3.4 and Theorem 3.6) are also established; such game forms have been considered before (e.g., Moulin, 1980 , Kukushkin, 1995 , or Mariotti, 2000 , but improvement dynamics in them seem to have never been studied.
Concerning coalition improvements, a complete description of game forms where all such improvement paths in all derivative games lead to strong equilibria is obtained; not surprisingly, there are not so many of them (Theorem 4.2) . A slight weakening of the requirement widens the class significantly. It is shown that "voting by veto" procedures (Mueller, 1978; Peleg, 1978) generate game forms where the convergence of coalition improvements to strong equilibria is ensured if the players restrict themselves to "minimal" strategy changes (Theorem 4.10).
In Section 2 the basic definitions concerning improvement dynamics in finite strategic games are given; the notion of a game form is introduced and examples of game forms ensuring the acyclicity of improvements are provided. Section 3 contains some general results about game forms with acyclic individual improvements; the class of "ordered voting game forms" is defined. Subsection 3.2 is about games with perfect information; Subsection 3.3, about exact potential, a cardinal analog of acyclicity. Section 4 contains the characterization of game forms with acyclic coalition improvements; in Subsection 4.2, voting by veto procedures are defined and their interesting properties proven.
Basic Notions

Improvement paths in strategic games
Our basic model is a finite strategic game with ordinal preferences. It is defined by a finite set of players N (we denote n = #N ), and finite strategy sets X i and ordinal utility functions u i : X N → R, where X N = i∈N X i , for all i ∈ N . We denote N = 2 N \ {∅} (the set of potential coalitions) and X I = i∈I X i for each I ∈ N ; instead of X N \{i} and X N \I , we write X −i and X −I , respectively. If n = 2, then −i refers to the partner of player i.
Remark. Whenever v i : R → R is strictly increasing, the functions u i and v i • u i represent the same ordering. Therefore, any meaningful definition, condition, statement, etc., involving ordinal utility functions must be invariant to strictly increasing transformations. Auxiliary constructions, however, may well use numeric values.
With every strategic game, a number of improvement relations on X N are associated (i ∈ N , I ∈ N , y N , x N ∈ X N ): Defining the best response correspondence R i : X −i → 2 X i for each i ∈ N in the usual way,
for every x −i ∈ X −i , we may introduce one more relation:
(best response improvement relation).
It is often convenient to speak of just "an improvement relation" without specifying which of the above-defined relations is meant. A maximizer of an improvement relation , i.e., a strategy profile x N ∈ X N such that y N x N holds for no y N ∈ X N , is an equilibrium: a Nash equilibrium if is Ind ; a ("very") strong equilibrium if is sCo ( wCo ). Every Nash equilibrium is a maximizer of BR . If R i (x −i ) = ∅ for all i ∈ N and x −i ∈ X −i , then the converse statement is also true; in a finite game, the condition holds automatically.
Following Kukushkin (2004a) , we consider an arbitrary binary relation on a finite set X. An improvement path (for ) is a (finite or infinite) sequence {x
; a relation is acyclic if it admits no finite improvement cycle. On a finite set, that property is equivalent to the impossibility of an infinite improvement path; therefore, every improvement path, if continued whenever possible, reaches a maximizer (equilibrium) in a finite number of steps.
It is easy to see that a binary relation on a finite set X is acyclic if and only if it admits a numeric potential, i.e., a function P : X → R such that
(2.5a) the property is also equivalent to the existence of an order potential, i.e., an irreflexive and transitive binary relation on X such that
The relation is weakly acyclic if every x ∈ X is connected to a maximizer of with an improvement path, i.e., there is a finite improvement path {x
is a maximizer. The weak acyclicity does not exclude the possibility that an improvement process may continue indefinitely without reaching an equilibrium; however, this is improbable under reasonable assumptions (Kalai and Schmeidler, 1977; Milchtaich, 1996; Friedman and Mezzetti, 2001 ).
Clearly, acyclicity implies weak acyclicity, which, in turn, implies the existence of a maximizer of . Neither statement can be reversed.
An essential feature of the improvement relations in a strategic game defined by (2.1)-(2.4) is their disjunctive structure, reflected in (2.1b), etc. It allows us to introduce an intermediate class of properties. We consider an abstract relation with a disjunctive structure, i.e., assume that there are a finite set M (in strategic games, M = N for individual improvements and M = N for coalition improvements) and binary relations i on X for each i ∈ M such that y x ⇐⇒ ∃i ∈ M [y i x] for all y, x ∈ X. We say that is acyclic under restrictions if there are binary relations > and > i on X such that, for all i ∈ M and y, x ∈ X, there holds
If is acyclic, then all conditions (2.6) are satisfied by itself as >, i.e., is acyclic under restrictions. In any case, the conditions (2.6a) and (2.6b) imply that every improvement path of > is an improvement path of and both relations have the same maximizers. It follows immediately that a relation acyclic under restrictions is weakly acyclic. When is acyclic under restrictions, an order potential of > may be called a restricted order potential of [cf. Proposition 6.4 of Kukushkin (2004a) ].
Restricted acyclicity means that it is possible to impose restrictions on each player's (or coalition's) strategy changes so that whenever an improvement is possible, an admissible improvement is possible as well, and the convergence to an equilibrium is ensured. When an improvement relation is only weakly acyclic, an agreement between the players as to who is allowed to improve at each stage may be needed. (Explicit cooperation can be replaced with a stochastic choice of the player or coalition to move at each step.) The example in Section 7.7 of Kukushkin (2004a) 
Actually, the FBRP is a restricted FIP.
These properties admit the same dynamic interpretation as the (weak or restricted) acyclicity of an abstract binary relation. The FCP( + ), FIP, or FBRP ensure that all appropriate adaptive dynamics converge to an equilibrium in a finite number of steps. The weak FCP( + ), weak FIP, or weak FBRP ensure the convergence to an appropriate equilibrium in a finite number of steps with probability one under reasonable assumptions. The properties are also conducive to the convergence of more sophisticated scenarios (Young, 1993; Kandori and Rob, 1995; Friedman and Mezzetti, 2001 ).
Remark. According to Proposition 6.4 of Kukushkin (2004a) , weak and restricted FBRP are equivalent for two person games; unfortunately, neither property seems natural for game forms, which are the subject of this paper. The equivalence does not hold w.r.t. the FIP or FCP( + ).
Game forms
A game form G is defined by a finite set of players N , a finite strategy set X i for each i ∈ N , a finite set of outcomes A and a mapping g : X N → A, where X N = i∈N X i is the set of strategy profiles. For notational simplicity, we assume X i ∩ X j = ∅ whenever i = j; the assumption is obviously innocuous. We denote X = i∈N X i .
Once preferences of the players over the outcomes are specified (and we always assume this to be done with ordinal utilities υ i : A → R), a derivative game G(υ N ) (where υ N denotes a list υ i i∈N ) emerges, in which the set of players is N , the strategy sets are X i 's and utilities are
If every derivative game G(υ N ) possesses a Nash (strong) equilibrium, G is called Nash (strong) consistent. We say that G has the FIP, FCP or FCP + ) if so does every derivative game G(υ N ). We also use the expression G is an FIP, or FCP ( + ) game form. If G has the FIP (FCP), then G is Nash (strongly) consistent; the converse statements are wrong.
Remark. FBRP game forms could be defined quite similarly; however, there is no example of an FBRP game form without the FIP. Moreover, Corollary 2 from Kukushkin (2007a) shows that the FIP and FBRP are equivalent as properties of two person game forms.
Example 2.1. Let us consider four game forms with two players:
It is easily seen that each of them has the FIP, but only the first has FCP (and FCP + at that).
Example 2.2. Let us consider two game forms with two players:
It is easily checked that both game forms are Nash consistent; actually, the northwestern corner is a Nash equilibrium for all utilities. Meanwhile, the underlined strategy profiles form an improvement cycle for appropriate utilities in either game form, hence neither has the FIP. However, there is an important difference between them.
Suppose that the utilities of the players in the first game form satisfy these inequalities:
The northwestern corner is a unique Nash equilibrium; an agreement to choose it is self-policing in the usual sense. On the other hand, an agreement not to choose equilibrium strategies is self-policing as well: if I believe that my partner honors the agreement, I have no incentive to cheat. Moreover, each player would prefer the second agreement, which ensures the choice of one of the underlined outcomes, to the first, notwithstanding the fact that the resulting outcome remains unpredictable. The "irrelevance of equilibria" of this kind was discussed by Kreps (1990, pp. 416-417) . Example 1.3 in Kukushkin (2002b) demonstrates a similar problem concerning strong equilibria.
One could argue that the second agreement is just to choose a mixed equilibrium; note, however, that our players have ordinal preferences, hence they need not be able to compare probability distributions on the set of outcomes. More technically speaking, a mixed equilibrium whose support consists of the underlined strategy profiles exists for every pair of utility functions representing the same preferences, but its probability distribution is not invariant under monotonic transformations.
No such ugly thing may happen when a game has the FIP or FCP( + ); actually, the weak FIP or weak FCP( + ) is sufficient (Theorems 3.1-3.3 of Kukushkin, 2002b) . The second game form has the weak FIP, hence is immune to this pathology at least. The notion of restricted acyclicity admits a strengthening when applied to game forms. An admissible change (by coalition I ∈ N ) relation is a binary relation I on X N such that
i.e., if every change of outcome available to a coalition (or a player) can be done in an admissible way.
A game form G has an almost unrestricted FIP if there is a list of admissible change relations i i∈N such that every i is liberal and, in every derivative game G(υ N ), the admissible improvement relation > defined by (2.6c) with M = N and
is acyclic. A game form G has an almost unrestricted FCP if there is a list of admissible change relations I I∈N such that every I is liberal and, in every derivative game G(υ N ), the admissible improvement relation > defined by (2.6c) with M = N and
is acyclic. Naturally, an almost unrestricted FIP (FCP) of a game form ensures the existence of a (strong) Nash equilibrium in every derivative game, but it is much more than that.
Remark. The game form in Example 2.2b has an almost unrestricted FCP although it seems not to be covered by Theorems 3.6 or 3.13 or 4.10 below.
The notion admits a more concrete interpretation. We may assume that there are costs associated with every change of strategy and that a change is admissible if its cost is minimal among all changes leading to the same outcome. To be more formal, we define a quasidistance on X I as a mapping δ :
When an almost unrestricted FIP is concerned, only singleton I are needed, naturally. Given a family of quasidistances on X I parameterized with x −I ∈ X −I , we define an admissible change relation by
Since X I is finite, (2.7) holds, i.e., the relation is liberal. Therefore, a list of quasidistances on all X I (X i ) generates an admissible improvement relation >, based on (2.10), (2.9) or (2.8), and (2.6c) with M = N or M = N , in every derivative game G(υ N ).
Proposition 2.3. A game form G has an almost unrestricted FCP (FIP) if and only if there is a family of quasidistances δ x
Proof. Sufficiency is tautological. Let G have an almost unrestricted FCP with an admissible improvement relation >. For each I ∈ N , we define * I as the transitive closure of I , and
is a quasidistance. Now (2.10) with this family δ x −I defines * I ; in every derivative game, (2.9) defines the admissible improvement relation > * I , which is the transitive closure of > I ; therefore, > * is acyclic too. The case of an almost unrestricted FIP is treated in the same way.
In the following theorems, we always define admissible changes through quasidistances, i.e., "costs," which look reasonable in each case.
A fragment G of G is a game form with the same set of players N , nonempty subsets ∅ = X i ⊆ X i for all i ∈ N , and the restriction of g to X N as g . If G has the FIP (FCP), then so does every fragment of G; (strong) Nash consistency, or even a restricted FIP (FCP), need not be "inherited" in this sense.
FIP Game Forms
Simple and ordered voting game forms
A game form G is separable if it is possible to define a "pointer" mapping p : X → A such that
for every x N ∈ X N . In principle, the same g may be described by (3.1) with different mappings p; moreover, some p(x i ) may be arbitrary. An interpretation should be clear: choosing a strategy x i , player i as if expresses a wish to see p(x i ) chosen; the mapping g determines whose desire will be fulfilled at each strategy profile.
Remark. The term is due to Vladimir Gurvich (a seminar presentation). Boros et al. (2008b) suggest "assignable game forms"; however, the inevitable association with the "assignment problem" appears undesirable.
Hypothesis 3.1. Every FIP game form is separable.
The converse implication is obviously wrong. Every game form in Examples 2.1 and 2.2 is separable. For n = 2, the statement is proven in Boros et al. (2008b) .
The simplest separable game forms are dictatorial ones, where there is a player i ∈ N such that g(x N ) = p(x i ) for all x N ∈ X N ; see Example 2.1a. Unless g(X N ) is a singleton, there cannot be more than one dictator; p(x j ) for j = i may be arbitrary.
A game form is simple if it is separable and there is a linear order on X such that
for every x N ∈ X N . (Again, the same g may be described by (3.2) with different orders on X .) Besides a desirable outcome, every strategy specifies a priority of the desire; then the choice with the highest priority is implemented. If G is dictatorial, we may define x i < x j for every strategy of the dictator i and all j = i. Every fragment of a simple game form is simple as well.
Remark. Boros et al. (2008ab) call such game forms "totally reducible"; however, a lone adjective seems preferable.
Given a game form, we call
Proposition 3.2. A game form G is simple if and only if there is a simple strategy in every fragment of G.
Proof. If G is simple and G is a fragment of G, we pick the minimal strategy in i∈N X i ; (3.2) immediately implies that it is simple in G . Conversely, we pick a simple strategy in X and declare it the least in X ; then we forget it and define a linear order on X by induction. 
All game forms in Example 2.1 except the last one are simple. Theorem 5 of Boros et al. (2008a) shows that every two person game form which has the FIP but is not simple must contain that matrix. When n > 2, even that much cannot be asserted, see Example 4.8 below.
"Dually" to dictatorial game forms, priorities of the strategies may be determined by the outcomes pointed to. Let A be linearly ordered and
for each x N ∈ X N ; Example 2.1c presents such a game form. A possible interpretation: each player chooses a maximal "level of cooperation" she is ready to accept; then the highest level acceptable to everybody becomes the norm. The term unanimity game forms may be appropriate.
Proposition 3.4. Every unanimity game form has the FIP.
Proof. The game form is simple:
; the strategies with the same p(x i ) are ordered arbitrarily. Now Theorem 3.3 applies.
Generalizing the notion, we may assume that an outcome is socially acceptable if a certain fraction of players finds it so; the median is most usual in political sciences. Moulin (1980) considered such game forms, with the addition of "fixed votes" to the players' choices, and established some nice properties of them when the preferences are single-peaked. Here we abandon the anonymity requirement and allow arbitrary preferences. Thus, the order on the set of outcomes becomes an element of the decision making procedure, unrelated to the players' preferences.
An ordered voting game form is defined by the following construction. A is linearly ordered and X i = A for each i ∈ N . Strictly speaking, our assumption X i ∩ X j = ∅ is thus violated, but it does not matter here. For each i ∈ N , a "weight" µ i ≥ 0 is given; for each a ∈ A, a number λ a > 0. We assume that λ a decreases in a. Given x N ∈ X N and a ∈ A, we denote N
The interpretation is that each player chooses a "personal cap" x i supported by her weight µ i ; λ a is the minimal total weight against a that makes it ineligible.
If all µ i = 1 and λ a = 1, we have a unanimity game form, the FIP of which was established by Proposition 3.4; if all µ i = 1 and λ a = n, we have g(x N ) = max i∈N x i , i.e., Proposition 3.4 is still applicable after the order on A is reversed. Generally, there is no FIP. The underlined outcomes form an improvement cycle in G(υ N ) with appropriate utilities; therefore, G does not have the FIP (although it is Nash consistent).
Somewhat unnatural behavior may be observed in the cycle: in the "clockwise" movement, player 2 switches from a to b by choosing c, and from c to b by choosing a.
Given a, b ∈ A, we define the order distance between them as
then we define an admissible change relation by (2.10) with d as δ x −i for every i ∈ N and x −i ∈ X −i . In other words, a change of strategy is admissible if the same change of outcome could not be produced by a shorter movement of x i .
Theorem 3.6. Every ordered voting game form has an almost unrestricted FIP with the quasidistance on each
A binary relation on X N is defined as a lexicography:
Clearly,
Finally, a lexicographic aggregate is formed of m (m ∈ M ):
Obviously, is a strict order; we'll show that it is a potential, in the sense of (2.5b), for admissible improvements. Let i ∈ N and x N , y N ∈ X N be such that y −i = x −i ; we denote a = g(x N ) and b = g(y N ) and assume b = a. For every c ∈ A, we denote c + 1 the next point in A, uniquely defined by c + 1 > c and d(c, c + 1) = 1.
Step 3.6.
Step 3.6.2.
In the following, we assume y i = b.
Step 3.6.3.
The case of b < a is treated dually.
Step 3.6.4.
Step 3.6.3. If the inclusion is strict, we even have
Step 3.6.5.
Step 3.6.3. Since i ∈ B µ i (y N ), we only have to consider the case of
In the light of Steps 3.6.4 and 3.6.5, the proof of the theorem is accomplished. Theorem 3.6 becomes wrong if strategy sets X i ⊂ A are allowed: the assumption X 2 = {a, c} in Example 3.5 would make the changes made by player 2 along the cycle unique.
Remark. In the absence of fixed votes, i.e., when λ a is the same for all a ∈ A, an ordered voting game form is obviously separable: p(x i ) = x i . The statement seems to be wrong generally although I have not studied the question carefully.
Games with perfect information
The most important examples of game forms with FIP or almost unrestricted FIP are provided by the normal form of games with perfect information. Following Kukushkin (2002a) , we reproduce the familiar concepts in a fashion most convenient for our purposes.
A perfect information game form (PIGF ) is a game form with arbitrary (finite) sets N and A, and strategies and the mapping g generated by a construction as follows. A game tree K is a finite partially ordered set satisfying these two conditions. (a) For every α ∈ K, the set {β ∈ K | β ≤ α} is a chain. (b) There exists the minimum α 0 of K (the origin), α 0 ≤ α for every α ∈ K. The existence of the meet (greatest common lower bound) α∧β for every α, β ∈ K easily follows. We call β ∈ K an immediate successor of α ∈ K if α < β while α < β < β is impossible; the set of all immediate successors of α ∈ K is denoted X α . Imagining an arc from every α ∈ K to every β ∈ X α turns K into a tree in a geometrical sense.
The set of maximizers of the order on K is denoted T (terminal nodes); the set K \ T , D (decision nodes). There is an ownership mapping ν : D → N ; player i moves at nodes from
We denote X i = α∈D i X α for i ∈ N and X N = i∈N X i . We identify X N with α∈D X α . For every x N ∈ X N and α ∈ D, we denote π(α, x N ) ⊆ K the intersection of all subsets K of K satisfying these two conditions: α ∈ K and [β ∈ K ⇒ x β ∈ K ]; note that π(α, x N ) is a chain: a play of the game starting at α. The unique element of T ∩ π(α, x N ) is denoted τ (α, x N ): the result of playing x N starting at α.
Finally, there is a mapping γ : T → A and g(x N ) = γ(τ (α 0 , x N )). If γ is a bijection, G is called free; in this case, we may just assume A = T (as was done in Kukushkin, 2002a) . For each α ∈ D, we denote F (α) = γ({β ∈ T | β > α}), the set of outcomes feasible if the play passes through α.
To avoid pathologies, we always assume that #X α > 1 and #F (α) > 1 for every α ∈ D (i.e., there is no "meaningless" decision node), while X α ∩ D i = ∅ for all i ∈ N and α ∈ D i (i.e., no player can make two consecutive choices). The restrictions are innocuous and allow more compact formulations of Theorem 3.8, Hypothesis 3.10, and Proposition 3.19 below. The sufficiency part, naturally, holds for every PIGF, which cannot be said about the necessity.
Example 3.9. Let us consider a three-person perfect information game form with five decision nodes, six terminal nodes, and five outcomes. We assume
, e}; γ is described by putting outcomes at terminal nodes.
To extend Theorem 3.8 to the general case, we introduce the following requirements. First, the decision nodes of each player form a subsemilattice of the game tree, i.e., if a player moves at two incomparable nodes, he must move at their meet too:
The second condition needs some auxiliary notations. For i ∈ N and α, β ∈ D i , we denote:
(3.5b) If D i is a chain, then (3.5a) holds trivially while (3.5b) holds by default. Generally, conditions The necessity part is easily derived from the proof of Theorem 1 in Kukushkin (2002a) .
Proposition 3.11. Every perfect information game form satisfying assumptions (3.5) is separable.
Proof. Given i ∈ N and x i ∈ X i , we define α(x i ) as the greatest in the tree order (i.e., the furthest from the origin) decision node of player i that can be reached when player i chooses x i . It is well defined because of (3.5a). Now if x i prescribes to player i to choose a terminal node t at α(x i ), i.e., if
We denote i the player who made the last move in the play ending at t, and β the decision node where that last move was made. Obviously, β = α(x i ) and γ(t) = p(x i ).
By Proposition 3.7, every two-person perfect information game form satisfying assumptions (3.5) is simple. The converse to Proposition 3.11 is wrong: the proof only needs (3.5a). On the other hand, Proposition 3.11 becomes wrong if assumptions (3.5) are dropped altogether.
Example 3.12. Let us consider a free two-person perfect information game form with three decision nodes; we assume D 1 = {α 0 } and D 2 = {β , β }.
If it were a separable game form, we could, without restricting generality, assume p(β ) = a and
Given a perfect information game form, we define the distance between two strategies of the
Then we define admissible change relations for each i ∈ N by (2.10) with the quasidistances
In other words, a change of the strategy of a player is admissible if the number of nodes involved is minimal, i.e., there was no change at irrelevant nodes.
Theorem 3.13 (Theorem 3 of Kukushkin, 2002a). Every perfect information game form has an almost unrestricted FIP with admissible change relations defined by the "costs" (3.6).
Remark. A modification of the proof from Kukushkin (2002a) allows us to derive a corollary (Proposition 3.18 in the next subsection), which may be of some interest.
Proof. Let x N ∈ X N and t ∈ T ; we say that t is blocked by player i at x N if there exist α ∈ D i and β ∈ X α such that t ∈ π(β, x N ) \ π(α, x N ) (it follows immediately that τ (β, x N ) = t and x α = β). Let t = τ (α 0 , x N ); then the set {α < t | t / ∈ π(α, x N )} is a nonempty chain, so we may pick its maximum α and denote i = ν(α). Obviously, t is blocked by i at x N and t cannot be blocked at x N by any other player. We thus obtain a partitioning of T \ {τ (α 0 , x N )} into subsets B i (x N ) of terminal nodes blocked by each particular player i ∈ N at x N .
It is important to note that #B i (x N ) does not depend on x N ; actually, #B i (x N ) = [ α∈D i #X α ] − #D i because choosing any alternative from X α for α ∈ D i , player i does not choose each of #X α − 1 others thereby blocking the same number of terminal nodes (exactly which terminal nodes are blocked depends on the choices at successive nodes).
∈ π(α, y N ) and t = t ; moreover, t ∧ t ≤ α. Now t = τ (β, y N ) could only be possible if there were β ∈ π(β, x N ) such that y β = x β , hence β ∈ D i ; but then the replacement of x β with y β would be a superfluous change incompatible with the minimization of "costs" (3.6). More formally, considering z i which coincides with x i at β and with y i at all other nodes from
(3.7)
Thus, we have P (y N ) > P (x N ).
An extension of the notion of a PIGF is met in the literature quite often, see, e.g., Boros and Gurvich (2003) and references therein. Suppose there is a directed graph, its nonterminal nodes are partitioned among the players, and one of them is fixed as the origin. Each player is free to choose an arc leading from each of her decision nodes ("stationary strategies"); once all strategies are chosen, a play of the game is uniquely defined: after a finite number of steps, either a terminal node is reached, or a cycle starts repeating itself ad infinitum. Treating cycles as additional outcomes, we obtain a game form.
If the players were allowed to condition their choices on history, we would return to a game on a (finite or infinite) tree. The stationarity requirement is effectively equivalent to imperfect information: when making a decision at a node, the player does not know how the play has come there. It is well known that a game with imperfect information, even on a finite tree, need not possess a Nash equilibrium (unless mixed strategies are invoked). In this class of games, however, the lack of information only concerns the past, which does not affect future possibilities. Therefore, it seems natural to expect no big difference with the standard perfect information model. Indeed, if the graph is acyclic, i.e., the underlying tree is finite, an equilibrium can be obtained by the standard backward recursion. If cycles are possible, the underlying tree becomes infinite, and there is nowhere to derive an equilibrium from. An intermediate case emerges when the graph contains cycles, but every cycle is worse for each player than any terminal node (Boros and Gurvich, 2003) ; then no infinite play can result from any improvement.
Here we briefly consider the possibility to extend Theorem 3.13 to a game on an acyclic graph. The result, Theorem 3.14 below, is distinctly weaker; to be more precise, a restricted FIP is established, but an almost unrestricted FIP is not (so far).
The definition of a positional acyclic game form is most conveniently given in the same style as in the beginning of this subsection. Instead of a game tree, we consider a finite partially ordered set K satisfying condition (b) from the definition of a PIGF: the existence of the origin α 0 . The partition of K into decision nodes D and terminal nodes T is the same; the ownership mapping ν : D → N is the same; the definitions of immediate successors X α of α ∈ K, as well as strategies X i = α∈D i X α and strategy profiles X N = i∈N X i = α∈D X α are the same. Since condition (a) from the definition of a PIGF is dropped, we may always assume that γ is a bijection, i.e., T = A. A play of the game starting at α, π(α, x N ) ⊆ K, is defined in the same way, and still is a chain; the result of playing x N starting at α, τ (α, x N ), is still uniquely defined. Finally, the assumption X α ∩ D i = ∅ for all i ∈ N and α ∈ D i no longer looks innocuous and is not made.
We start with the definition of a strengthened version of restricted FIP. Given a family of "costs" δ x −i on each X i , we define the cost-efficient individual improvement relation on X N by
A game form has an FCIP if there are "costs" δ x −i on each X i such that the cost-efficient individual improvement relation (3.8) is acyclic in every derivative game.
Theorem 3.14. Every positional acyclic game form has an FCIP with the "costs" (3.6). N ) ): what the player who moves at α would get if the play passes through the node. Then we define a lexicographic order on X N :
Clearly, is a strict order.
Supposing that 
Let us show that
v β * (y N ) > v β * (x N ). Supposing the contrary, we define z N ∈ X N by z β * = x β * and z α = y α for all α = β * . Clearly, u i (z N ) = v β * (z N ) = v β * (x N ) ≥ v β * (y N ) = u i (y N ). Since d(x i , z i ) < d(x i , y i ),
we have a contradiction with the assumption y
It is impossible to derive an almost unrestricted FIP from the above argument: the inequality v β * (y N ) > v β * (x N ) need not hold without the "cost-efficiency" of the improvement. Whether the conditions of Theorem 3.14 imply the property itself remains an open question. Proof. Let y N > i x N . In the notation from the proof of Theorem 3.14, we have B = {β * },
It is funny to contrast Proposition 3.15 with Theorem 3.8. Proof. Retaining the notation from the proof of Theorem 3.14 and arguing in the same way, it is easy to show that y N x N whenever y N Ind x N .
The converse to Proposition 3.16 is wrong. There is no plausible hypothesis about necessary and sufficient conditions for FIP in this class of game forms.
Cardinal utilities and potentials
Although our main subject are games with ordinal preferences and we do not consider mixed extensions, it seems impossible not to say a few words about cardinal utilities. Actually, Monderer and Shapley (1996) paid most attention to that case. Moreover, they assumed that the utilities of all players are measured in the same scale; we make the same assumption here.
Let Γ be a game with such "co-cardinal" utilities. Monderer and Shapley (1996) defined an exact potential of Γ as a function P : X N → R such that
whenever i ∈ N , y N , x N ∈ X N , and y −i = x −i . The latter notion is indeed ordinal, i.e., invariant under strictly increasing transformations of utilities. Voorneveld and Norde (1996) showed that the existence of an ordinal potential is equivalent to the absence of "weak improvement cycles."
Obviously, (3.10) implies (3.11), of which it is the most natural cardinal analogue.
Theorem 3.17. For every game form G, the following statements are equivalent.
Every derivative game G(υ N ) admits an exact potential.
Every derivative game G(υ N ) admits an ordinal potential.
G is dictatorial.
Proof. The implications [Statement 3 ⇒ Statement 1 ⇒ Statement 2] are straightforward. Let Statement 2 hold.
Step 3.17.1.
Proof. Supposing the contrary, we denote y N = (z j , x −j ). Then we pick a constant as υ j , and define υ i (g(x N )) = 1 and
, and υ j (g(y N )) = υ j (g(x N )); clearly, this is incompatible with (3.11). Otherwise, if g(x N ) = g(z N ), we set υ i (g(y N )) = 0 and again obtain the same cycle:
[a numeric value cannot be specified because both g(y N ) = g(x N ) and g(y N ) = g(y N ) are possible] and again obtain the same cycle.
Step 3.17.2.
, hence the previous argument applies and player j cannot change the outcome. Therefore, if x −j = x −j and y −j = y −j , then the assumptions of the lemma hold for x N and y N as well, hence no player k can change the outcome deviating from x k at x −k . Iterating the reasoning, we see that player i is a dictator.
If #g(X
Step 3.17.2 applies.
We call G a nearly potential game form if there is a liberal admissible change relation i on X N for each i ∈ N , and a function P : X N → R for every derivative game G(υ N ) such that (3.10) holds whenever i ∈ N , y N , x N ∈ X N , x N i y N , and g(y N ) = g(x N ). We call G an almost potential game form if there is a function P : X N → R for every derivative game G(υ N ) such that (3.10) holds whenever i ∈ N , y N , x N ∈ X N , x −i = y −i , and g(y N ) = g(x N ). Clearly, every almost potential game form has the FIP while every nearly potential game form has an almost unrestricted FIP.
Proposition 3.18. Every perfect information game form is a nearly potential one. If ν is injective, i.e., each player has at most one decision node, then it is an almost potential game form.
Proof. Defining the admissible change relations by the "costs" (3.6) and potential P as in the proof of Theorem 3.13, we refer to (3.7). If each D i is a singleton, then every change of strategy producing a change of outcome is admissible. Proof. The necessity of (3.5a) for the FIP is easy to see regardless of Hypothesis 3.10, so if ν is not injective, we may assume that ν(α) = ν(α ) = i while α < α . By the non-degeneracy assumptions, there must be β ∈ D j such that α < β < α and j = i. Since G is free, there must be a fragment of the type a b b a c d
where player i chooses columns and player j rows, and different letters denote different outcomes. Individual changes of strategies starting at the northwestern corner produce this cycle of outcomes:
Clearly, the equality does not hold for all utility functions.
The assumption that the game form is free cannot be dropped. Example 4.8 below disproves putative hypotheses like "every nearly (or almost) potential game form can be represented as a perfect information game form"; on the other hand, such examples seem rare, so a plausible hypothesis may be obtainable.
FCP Game Forms
Characterization
Given I ∈ N \ {N }, a superfragment of G is a game form with two players, "I" and "−I," nonempty subsets of X I and X −I as strategy sets, respectively, and the appropriate restriction of g. The FCP( + ) of G obviously implies the same property of every superfragment; no such assertion holds for the FIP.
Following Boros et al. (2008a) , we call a game form G totally tight if every 2×2 superfragment of G contains a simple strategy; in other words, if the condition
holds for each I ∈ N , x I , x I ∈ X I and x −I , x −I ∈ X −I . 
An interpretation should be clear: all strategies of a player or a coalition are (weakly) ordered according to how much effort is spent in trying to switch from a status quo ante outcome q to the unique available alternative; whenever the effort proves insufficient, less effort cannot be sufficient. The term "a binary lobbing game form" may be appropriate.
Proof. Necessity. Let (4.1) hold everywhere. For each I ∈ N , we define a binary relation on X I :
the relation is obviously a preorder. Incomparability of y I and x I would immediately imply a violation of (4.1); therefore, I is an ordering for every I ∈ N . The "monotonicity" requirement (4.2) immediately follows from (4.3).
Sufficiency. Suppose that (4.2) holds, but (4.1) is violated by a superfragment. Without restricting generality, x I I x I and x −I −I x −I ; therefore, g(x I , x −I ) = q. The supposed negation of (4.1) implies that g(
Theorem 4.2. A game form G has the FCP if and only if G is either dictatorial, or totally tight with #g(X
Remark. So far, there is no explanation for the obvious similarity with Arrow's impossibility theorem. Step 4.2.1. #g(X N ) ≤ 2 for every 2 × 2 superfragment of G.
Proof. Suppose the contrary: there is a superfragment of G of the type a b d c with a = b = c = a. Let I choose rows and −I columns. We consider a utility vector υ N such that
Suppose that G is not dictatorial. Then for each i ∈ N there is x i ∈ X i such that #g(x i , X −i ) ≥ 2. Moreover, at least two players are not "dummies," i.e., there is
Step 4.2.1. It follows immediately that #g(x i , X −i ) ≤ 2 for every non-dummy i ∈ N and x i ∈ X i . Thus, either G is dictatorial or #g(X N ) = 2. In the latter case, the necessity of (4.1) is shown exactly as in Moulin (1976) . Proof. If G is dictatorial, there is nothing to prove. If A = {q, a}, we define p(x i ) = q for all strategies of one player, p(x j ) = a for another, and arbitrarily for all others. Proof. Sufficiency. Let #N = 2. Given a utility vector υ N , we take υ * N with the property Necessity. Let #g(X N ) > 1; then there are i ∈ N x i , x i ∈ X i , and 
If #g(X
N ) > 2, there must exist i ∈ N , x i , x i ∈ X i and a, b, c, d ∈ A such that a = b = c = a, b = d = c, g(x i , X −i ) = {a, b}, and g(x i , X −i ) = {c, d}. We pick x −i ∈ X −i such that g(x i , x −i ) = b. If g(x i , x −i ) = a, we pick x −i ∈ X −i such that g(x i , x −i ) = cυ * i (a) > υ * i (b) ⇐⇒ υ i (a) > υ i (b) or [υ i (a) = υ i (b) & υ −i (a) > υ −i (b)]x −i ∈ X −i such that a = g(x i , x −i ) = g(x i , x −i ) = b. Supposing #N > 2, we can pick j, k ∈ N such that j = i = k = j. Whenever υ i (a) = υ i (b), υ j (a) > υ j (b), and υ k (a) < υ k (b),
Voting by veto
The title of this subsection refers to a class of voting procedures; each of them defines a game form. There are finite sets of players N and of outcomes, or alternatives, A. The players may have arbitrary preferences over the outcomes. A voting by veto procedure specifies positive integer numbers λ a and µ i for each a ∈ A and i ∈ N : µ i is the number of black balls given to player i; λ a is the "veto-resistance" of outcome a. Each player allocates his/her black balls among the outcomes; if the number of balls allocated to a ∈ A equals or exceeds λ a , the outcome is vetoed. To ensure the existence of non-vetoed outcomes, we impose the restriction For brevity, a game form generated by a voting by veto procedure is called a VV game form. Every ordered voting game form from Subsection 3.1 with integer µ's and λ's can be represented as the fragment of a VV game form: each player i can choose a ∈ A \ {min A} and put µ i black balls against a and each outcome above a. Since N and A are finite, it seems plausible that integer µ's and λ's are sufficient to generate all ordered voting game forms. Noninteger µ's and λ's, apparently, would generate a broader class of VV game forms; however, such voting procedures may seem too exotic, and are outside the realm of finite game forms anyway. Generally, fragments of VV game forms do not possess any nice property: the underlined 2 × 2 fragment in Example 4.6 is not even Nash consistent.
Remark. If there is
. In a sense, the elimination of such outcomes would not change the game form; however, their presence creates no difficulties either. Proof. Without restricting generality, we assume g(X N ) = {q, a} with q > a; then λ q + λ a > i∈N µ i . For each I ∈ N and x I , x I ∈ X I , we define x I I x I κ(q, x I ) ≥ κ(q, x I ). It is clear now that G satisfies (4.2), hence the sufficiency part of Theorem 4.2 applies. Assuming υ 1 (a) = υ 1 (b) = 1, υ 1 (c) = 0, υ 2 (a) = υ 2 (b) = 0, υ 2 (c) = 1, we see that the underlined outcomes form an improvement cycle in G(υ N ) ; therefore, G does not have even the FIP (although it is strongly consistent).
Example 4.6 carries a subtler message as well. We might distinguish between "outcomes" from A and "voting proposals": since υ i (a) = υ i (b) for both i in the example, we may assume that a and b are just different proposals implying the same outcome, hence #A = 2. Therefore, Proposition 4.5 would not survive this generalization of the notion of voting by veto. 
, and we are home again. Thus, G is simple by Proposition 3.2.
To start the derivation of Statement 3, we define r i (x i ) for i ∈ N and x i ∈ X i as the rank of
Step 4.7.1.
Proof. By (4.3), there must be It is not difficult to check that the game form is an almost potential one; however, it cannot be represented as a perfect information game form. Conditions (4.1) are easy to check, hence the game form is totally tight. Suppose it can be represented as the fragment of a VV game form. Since the roles of a and q are perfectly symmetric, we may, without restricting generality, assume q > a; therefore, a is selected when and only when q is vetoed. We denote x s i the number of black balls cast at q by player i(∈ {1, 2}) when using s-th strategy, counting upwards for player 1 and from the left to right for player 2. Proof. For every x N , y N ∈ X N , a ∈ A, t ∈ D, and I ∈ N , we define:
(over-vetoing at a and total over-vetoing);
("empty slots" at a);
(the sets of outcomes that are "close enough" to being selected and of the balls cast there); For every I ∈ N , the family of quasidistances on X I defined in (4.5) generates an admissible change relation I , hence an admissible improvement relation > in every derivative game. The notion of admissibility combines the ideas from the proofs of Theorems 3.6 and 3.13: the players shift as few balls as possible and move them as short a distance as possible; first of all, however, they avoid over-vetoing at any cost.
Given a list of utilities υ i i∈N , we define We start with the demonstration of the possibility to switch from a to b without any increase in over-vetoing. If β(b, x N ) = 0, then ε(b, x N ) + 1 balls must be taken from b to ensure (4.7a); Inequality (4.4) ensures that the total number of "empty slots," c∈A β(c, x N ), is no less than that. Therefore, the members of I can make (4.7a) fulfilled without creating over-vetoing. (Since coalition I was able to make b selected, #x −1 I (b) must be large enough.) Similarly, no over-vetoing could help ensuring (4.7b). Since y I is the least cost way to switch from a to b, there must be δ x −I (x I , y I ) < +∞. Therefore, there was no increase in over-vetoing at any outcome c ∈ A when x N was replaced with y N , i.e. Example 4.6 above shows that the adjective "almost unrestricted" in Theorem 4.10 cannot be dropped; actually, both improvements by player 1 there create over-vetoing.
In principle, the notion of voting by veto can be extended by considering other rules for the selection of a single non-vetoed outcome at every strategy profile. Assuming that (4.4) holds as an equality, the existence of a strong equilibrium can be shown for any g (Moulin, 1983) . Under a strict inequality, even Nash consistency is not ensured. Player 1 cannot ensure g(x N ) ∈ {a, c}; player 2 cannot ensure g(x N ) ∈ {b, d}. Therefore, the game form is not Nash consistent (Gurvich, 1975 (Gurvich, , 1988 Moulin, 1976) .
It remains unclear to what extent Theorem 4.10 could be generalized to other mappings g. So far, an almost unrestricted FCP was only established for a rather peculiar tie-breaking procedure suggested by Gol'berg and Gurvich (1986) , which is only defined when (4.4) holds as an equality. Example 2.1d is generated by that procedure.
